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There is no agony like bearing an untold story inside you.
—Zora Neale Hurston
When Ida B. Wells stood before a crowd of the social hierarchy of black 
women from Boston, Brooklyn, New York City, and Philadelphia at New York’s 
Lyric Hall on October 5, 1892, according to her autobiography, she simply 
wanted to deliver her testimonial “of that horrible lynching affair” (Crusade 79). 
Wells was referring to earlier in the year on March 9 in Memphis, Tennessee, 
when a mob of masked men pulled Wells’ friends Calvin McDowell, William 
Stuart, and Theodore Moss from their jail cell in the predawn hours when 
they were lynched and “shot to pieces” (New York Times, 10 March 1892). As 
editor of Free Speech, the black Memphis newspaper she co-owned, the thir-
ty-year old Wells was away “carrying on the work of [Free Speech]” (Crusade 47) 
in Natchez, Mississippi, when she heard of the Lynching at the Curve1. Wells’ 
1892 testimonial at New York’s Lyric Hall, Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All 
its Phases, is the founding rhetorical text in the anti-lynching movement that 
called for a moral, religious, and legal referendum on lynching in America. By 
forsaking all of the commonplace rationale for lynching and the Southern so-
cial comfort that came with it, Wells reframed the simplistic characterizations 
of lynching with new questions to demonstrate its structural features. With 
the cleavage of politics and economics to lynching, Wells would offer a new 
interpretation of lynching and emerge as the principle shaper of America’s 
anti-lynching crusade.
Although lynchings were a cultural feature of the Southern American ethos 
after slavery and Reconstruction, in 1892 there was an astonishing “increase 
of 200 percent” (Horrors 10) of blacks lynched by white mobs. Upon returning 
to Memphis, Wells discovered that not only were McDowell, Stuart, and Moss 
buried, but according to many of the black citizens of Memphis there was a 
“strong belief that the criminal court judge was one of the lynchers” (Crusade 
55). Wells realized that “despite [. . .] harping on the lynching” (Crusade 62) in 
her Free Speech editorials and the national attention that the lynchings brought 
to Memphis, no legal repercussion to the brutal murders would ever transpire. 
Like most blacks and whites, Wells was culturally constructed to believe 
that sexual contacts between black men and white women were always crimi-
nal. However, vested in assuring that McDowell, Stuart, and Moss would have 
due process, Wells demonstrated in Southern Horrors the consensual but 
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“illicit [sexual] associations between black men and white women” (Crusade 
69). Given the irrefutable ethos of McDowell, Stuart, and Moss, Wells modified 
her questions, and a new topography of race and class emerged. Wells’ inves-
tigation not only disrupted the previous narrative, it also generated a new way 
of seeing lynching that showed that the preservation of White Womanhood 
(Welter) was neither a motive in the Lynching at the Curve nor in the majority 
of lynchings in the South. The true motive, Wells discovered, was to create 
economic stasis for McDowell, Stuart, and Moss who “owned and operated a 
grocery store” (Crusade 47) which rivaled their white counterpart who previ-
ously “had had a monopoly” (Crusade 48) on black patronage. Wells explains 
that the radical interpretation “opened my eyes to what lynching really was” 
(Crusade 64). After she published her controversial evidence on the Lynching 
at the Curve, the office of Free Speech was destroyed, Wells’ life was publicly 
threatened, and she was exiled for her safety to New York City.
Wells’ anti-lynching movement is one of the most effective and efficient 
articulations of marginalized and disenfranchised people in American public 
address (Royster; Logan; Giddings; Schechter; Decosta-Willis). Wells’ pioneer-
ing Southern Horrors testimonial at Lyric Hall Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues, 
both rhetorically and strategically “use[d] evidence and argument” (436) to 
demonstrate that lynching was commonplace in the South. Further, Campbell 
notes, Wells’ testimonial “is noteworthy in three respects” (436):
First, as in her writings, [Wells] used evidence and argument in highly 
sophisticated ways, ways that prevented members of the audience 
from dismissing her claims as biased or untrue. Second, the speech 
was an insightful and sophisticated analysis of the interrelationship 
of sex, race, and class. Third, in contrast to the rhetorical acts of 
other women, this speech contained no stylistic markers indicating 
attempts by a woman speaker to appear “womanly” in what is per-
ceived as a male role—that of a rhetor. (436) 
 In addition to Campbell, scholars across disciplinary domains argue that Wells 
rightly deserves a prominent space in American public address discourse. For 
example, in “We Are Coming”: The Persuasive Discourse of Nineteenth-Century 
Black Women, rhetorical scholar Shirley Wilson Logan notes that although 
Wells was not the only orator to speak out against lynching, “none did more 
effectively and more consistently” (15). African American literature scholar 
Teresa Zackodnik describes Wells’ antilynching rhetoric as a “pedagogy of 
American lynching” (132) and argues that her speeches both in the United 
States and abroad significantly instituted changes in lynching laws. Historian 
Paula J. Giddings writes about the bootstrapping of the legal, communal, 
and spectacle aspect of lynching saying that “Wells saw it [lynching] within 
the context of her own life, times, and writings, as it migrated from the rural 
backwoods to the cities; from lone midnight murders to communal daylight 
spectacles in which bodies were dismembered and organs kept or sold as 
souvenirs; from southern cities to northern ones where lynchings took the 
form of “legal” executions by racist justice systems and mob-led riots that took 
multiple lives [. . .]” (Ida, A Sword 4).
While Giddings speaks to the legal complicity of lynching, Walter White, 
an African American civil rights activist who visually looked white but was 
genetically black, posits that lynch mobs drew their moral justification from 
Christianity and “it is exceedingly doubtful if lynching could possibly exist un-
der any other religion” (qtd in Wood 50). As a journalist who covered lynchings, 
we can presume that Wells saw both the material and photographic images of 
black bodies tortured, dismembered, and burned. However, it was the trauma 
of McDowell’s, Stuart’s, and Moss’ lynching embodied in Wells’ psychic con-
sciousness that, as she states, “changed the whole course of my life” (Crusade 
47). Thus, the Lynching at the Curve served as the exigence for Wells to use 
her skill and experience as a journalist for her lynching protest movement to 
oppose the terrorism of mob rule. By the rhetorical intertwining of legal dis-
cursive practices, the cultural method of testimony, and Christianity as moral 
reasoning for the dehumanization and lynching of blacks, Wells initiates a pro-
found rhetorical reflection on lynching in America.
From this space, I will examine Wells’ 1892 testimony at Lyric Hall using an 
interdisciplinary reading from rhetorical theory, legal brief writing, anthropol-
ogy, cognitive psychology, and historical criticism to illustrate how these bod-
ies of knowledge discursively intersect and interact in articulating the shaping 
presence of the agent. I will distinguish my notion of a shaping presence in 
five ways in which it acts as a rhetorical framing of both the agent and her 
visual and verbal discourse. A shaping presence in my articulation is a discur-
sive practice that conveys the ideology, nature, and characteristics of the ex-
perience of seeing. Second, it enables interdiscursivity between the orator’s 
representation of the experience and the audience’s cultural processing of the 
experience. Third, it is the rhetorical binding of the rhetor’s visual conscious-
ness and verbal consciousness. Fourth, it requires a method of reading, which 
is why the rhetor may use symbolic markers of culture, value-systems, and 
connection to a shared body of ideas for her audience to gain entrance into 
and engagement with the rhetor’s experience of seeing. And finally, a shaping 
presence is a public portraiture rather than the private identity of the rhetor. 
With this framing of a shaping presence, the essay proceeds in the follow-
ing steps. First, I begin by broadening Shirley Wilson Logan’s analysis of Wells’ 
construction of her rhetorical presence and examining how Wells’ Lyric Hall 
speech was constrained by and constitutive of the sociopolitical conditions 
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of lynching. Second, I demonstrate using Jerome Bruner’s narrative theories 
that it was the group narrative of blacks in Memphis, and not Wells’ self-nar-
rative, which fueled the onset of her anti-lynching movement. Third, I articu-
late Wells’ use of the ancient form of discourse ekphrasis to demonstrate its 
discursive role in Wells’ visual and verbal shaping presence of her testimony. 
Fourth, I argue that a shaping presence is not self-interpreting but imported 
with symbolic traffic from the rhetor’s culture. I conclude the essay discussing 
the implications for public address as civic awareness and the rhetorical inter-
dependence of the two
Shaping Presence at Lyric Hall
A shaping presence is a discursive practice that conveys the ideology, nature, and 
characteristics of the experience of seeing.
At what moment does an activist become—the activist—and the chief rep-
resentative of a sociopolitical movement? When does the rhetorical framing 
of an experience provide a larger and richer insight into an ideological point 
of focus? How does the rhetor express her personal attachment to an expe-
rience for a public performance to evoke sociopolitical action by uncovering 
the experience for an audience that represents their shared political interests? 
Further, what is the kairotic moment that initiates the ascent and exhibition of 
autopoiesis for the rhetor? For many activists of sociopolitical movements the 
questions are deferred to time, vague and shifting instincts, and early child-
hood traumatic experiences. For Ida B. Wells, her shaping presence as the 
most prominent anti-lynching orator in U.S. history was October 5, 1892 at 
Lyric Hall in New York City. Alternatively, perhaps, as she posits in Crusade, 
it was on March 9, 1892, when her friends McDowell, Stuart, and Moss were 
shot and lynched by a mob. At any rate, these two events interlock for Wells 
because both were anchors in her shaping presence. 
The belief that there is a convergence and strategic linking of subject, au-
dience, and occasion by the orator to “create rhetorical discourse” (Bitzer 1) 
is well defined in rhetorical studies. Indeed, the orator rhetorically assembles 
her discourse in a sustained and tactical manner to empower her audience 
to assist with change in favor of a sociopolitical interest. In her study of Wells’ 
agitation rhetoric against both the legal and cultural sanctioning of lynching, 
Shirley Wilson Logan examines presence in relation to how “Wells employs 
selective description to persuade audiences geographically and emotionally 
removed from the circumstances to which they were asked to respond” (74-
75). Logan follows by noting that “Well’s discourse not only invokes the pres-
ence of the act of lynching but also heightens awareness of the perpetrators 
and the carnivalesque atmosphere among the spectators” (75). Indeed, while 
I reinforce Logan’s examination of lynching as an attendant factor in Wells’ 
discourse, I employ the term “presence” in relation to the performative shap-
ing of Wells’ communication style as an artistic statement to examine lynch-
ing within the ideology of culture. Similarly, asserting that “there was art [. 
. .] in Wells’s discourse against mob violence” (75), Logan’s position opens a 
gateway to further theorize Wells’ rhetorical innovation to creatively resist and 
analytically break the moral closure of Southern lynching rationale. Therefore, 
in bracing my use of the term “shaping presence” to Logan’s, I confirm and 
expand her definition to emphasize both the verbal and visual characteristics 
manifest during Wells’ testimony at New York’s Lyric Hall. 
In order to tell the untold story to her Lyric Hall audience, Wells first had 
to produce, process, and perform the dynamic features of the Lynching at the 
Curve in her mind to visually shape what she wanted her audience to encoun-
ter during the experience of seeing. “Although every detail of that horrible 
lynching affair was imprinted on my memory,” writes Wells, “I had to commit it 
all to paper, and so I got up to read my story” (Crusade 79). By recognizing the 
relevance of the Lynching at the Curve to her middle-class black Lyric Hall au-
dience, Wells chose to translate the untold story through the performative and 
oral storytelling method of testimony. With the rhetorical virtuosity of an expe-
rienced journalist, Wells rooted her testimony in the cultural story of the black 
jeremiad to discredit the moral backing of Christianity that lynch mobs used to 
justify their vigilantism. Moreover, she followed the composition of legal dis-
cursive practices to illuminate the extensive lawlessness of lynching. With this 
strategy, Wells tacitly conveys in her testimony the inseparability of lynching, 
law, and Christianity. At first glance, this yoking may appear far-reaching and 
full of ambiguities when examined outside their rhetorical province. However, 
when examined more closely, by interweaving the three discourses of lynch-
ing, law, and Christianity, Wells rightly embeds and situates the narratives in a 
unified manner. This not only strengthened the rhetorical power of her Lyric 
Hall testimony, it also stimulated new questions about the political and legal 
role of lynching in a civil society
In the words of Geneva Smitherman, “testifyin” is a ritualized [form of black 
cultural expression] in which the speaker gives verbal [and visual] witness to 
the efficacy, truth, and power of some experience in which all blacks have 
shared” (58). This is an important point that Smitherman makes since “testifyin” 
is remarkably similar to legal deliberation in a court of law. Similarly, Wells em-
ploys the rhetoric, structure, and formality of a legal brief, which is an argument 
that details the main points of a case with evidence. Like biblical law, the body 
of laws that govern its citizenry is a legal system that generates outcomes in 
the name of justice. Smitherman has noted that, “[t]o testify is to tell the truth 
through ‘story’” (150), which enables the orator, and particularly the African 
American orator to invoke culturally inclusive language, customs, prominent 
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and accomplished African Americans, and traditions which resonate with au-
dience members who share the same kinship. As rhetorical strategy, testimo-
ny allowed Wells the agency to burrow her story within the religious language 
of biblical Christianity; it also was a familiar form of sociopolitical address to 
her middle-class audience, and like the law of the land, testifyin(g) within the 
provisions of Christianity had a binding, although spiritual, judgment. 
By using the classic format of a legal brief: summary of the argument, 
statement of the case, argument (s), and conclusion, Wells makes the case 
for the repeal of lynch law and authoritatively combines all of the rhetorical 
appeals—ethos, pathos, and logos—to expose the dehumanization and law-
lessness of lynching. Furthermore, the titles of each section of her Southern 
Horrors speech discursively parallel “point headings” used in a legal brief 
to guide the reader through the document (Ricks and Istvan 1115- 1116). 
However, before Wells proceeds with “The Offense,” her first point heading in 
Southern Horrors, she creates a “Preface” to establish her ethos and to define 
the pervasive legal impediments in the law blind to the practice of lynching. 
By using the rhetorical style of legal discourse to situate her argument, Wells’ 
adjudication begins by declaring that her objective is to give an “unvarnished 
account of the causes of lynch law in the South” (50). From there, Wells har-
monizes for her audience the central pillars of her argument—lynching, law, 
and Christianity
For example, Wells strategically invokes a visual anchor in her opening 
remarks with the biblical story of love, lust, and deception—Samson and 
Delilah2. With this famous and no doubt familiar narrative of betrayal tacitly 
presented to her black middle-class woman audience, Wells significantly in-
fluences their mental processing of black male/white female sexual relations 
that she will reiterate throughout her speech. With this imagery of the vulner-
able Samson to the sexually cunning Delilah embedded in her audience’s con-
sciousness, Wells tacitly generates a visual preference for the black male se-
duced by the white female. Another visual claim Wells makes in her argument 
is the social and legal preference for white bodies over black bodies. Further 
still, the Samson and Delilah narrative also functions as a reference and caveat 
to the social strictures of intermingling with lower class whites
As the first post-Reconstruction African Americans who were educated, 
entrepreneurs, and owned property, it is important to note that Wells’ black 
middle-class woman audience was not quite in the “middle” of American soci-
ety. That is, while they were elite in their social, economic, and educational sta-
tus compared to the majority of African Americans, black middle-class women 
were still on the social periphery with limited social and spatial mobility com-
pared to white middle-class women. However, it is safe to assume that al-
though they were elite, they still distinguished themselves from poorer blacks. 
In fact, Wells notes in Crusade that New Yorkers were not “[. . .] interested in 
anybody or anything [. . .] who did not belong to their circle” (78). Therefore, 
by visually prompting her black middle-class woman audience to sympathize 
with the black male by the politically coded insertion of the Samson and Delilah 
narrative, Wells’ encourages them to consider class structures since it was of 
strategic importance in the development of her testimony.
Wells continues with the deliberate construction of her ethos saying she 
is deeply committed to making “a contribution to truth [by providing] an array 
of facts [. . .] to demand that justice be done” (50). Indeed, by presenting a 
letter from Frederick Douglass as part of the careful shaping of her presence, 
Wells’ credentials as a witness to the lynching issue are legitimized without a 
self-centered tone. By tactically positioning her ethos next to Douglass’, Wells 
sought to create a uniform and visual reading of black racial and gendered 
opposition to dominant strategies of disempowerment. In this way, Wells cre-
ates an enabling and particular “oppositional gaze” (hooks) for her black mid-
dle-class woman audience to construct. Wells’ strategy is important since it 
builds and defines the ideological shaping of her presence, which was central 
to illuminating the perversion of the legal system, the rhetoric in laws, and 
their philosophical intimacy with lynching.  Therefore, in her first point head-
ing “The Offense,” Wells’ facility with legal discourse has established a point of 
entry for her to rupture the legal system and laws associated with the prac-
tices of lynching. To accomplish this task, Wells integrates another familiar 
rhetorical form of social criticism in her testimony—the black jeremiad3 to illu-
minate and emphasize how the discursive practices of the law and Christianity 
are wedded to the lives of African Americans.
In The Afro-American Jeremiad: Appeals for Justice in America, David 
Howard-Pitney observes that the American jeremiad, “a lamentation or dole-
ful complaint,” (6) was radically recast as the “black” jeremiad into a cultural, 
political, and rhetorical form of address by African American orators “from 
the age of the Civil War” (15) in response to America’s denial of their constitu-
tional guarantees. For Wells, like many African Americans, the Afro-American 
jeremiad was a powerful rhetorical strategy used to present a parallel reading 
of America and to restore moral balance to the ethos of a nation founded on 
religious ideology. Therefore, it is not inconsequential that religion, morality, 
and politics played a significant role in lynching discourse, and Wells, to her 
credit, wedded those discursive processes to the experience of seeing. 
For example, in “The Offense” Wells situates the beginning of her argu-
ment of black male/white female sexual relations by seriously questioning the 
logos of white men’s claim that white females are virtuous and defenseless. 
Wells validates visual imagery as a sensible form of meta-cognition by prompt-
ing her black middle-class woman audience to give public and deliberate visual 
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attention to what they have silently materialized in their private thoughts. 
Although this particular section of Southern Horrors was directed at Southern 
white men, the rhetorical arc of the testimony was framed exclusively for the 
visual consumption of her black middle-class woman audience when she 
states, “Nobody [my emphasis] in this section of the country believes the old 
thread-bare lie that Negro men rape white women” (52). This statement also 
recircles back to Wells’ highlighting of class status with the subtle stress on 
the educated black elite of the North. She continues with a bold warning to 
Southern White men saying, “If Southern white men are not careful, they will 
overreach themselves and public sentiment will have a reaction; a conclusion 
will then be reached which will be very damaging to the moral reputation of 
their women” (52). Once again, using visual signposts, Wells is stirring her 
black middle-class woman audience to grasp another lynching possibility by 
structuring what governs their visualizing during the experiencing of seeing. 
Understanding the social importance of middle-class comfort, Wells is 
tactfully and tactically suggesting to her “Northern” black middle-class woman 
audience that “Southern” white men would not want their ethos publicly soiled 
in exchange for defending sexually promiscuous white women from their so-
cial underclass. At first glance, it appears as though Wells is speaking singu-
larly of morals and manners. However, with a closer look, one can argue that 
Wells is also juxtaposing white male masculinity to black male masculinity with 
the sexual desire of white women making the determination. It is important to 
note that in the nineteenth century white men from the social elite were also 
bound to Victorian ideals of behavior just as white women were bound to the 
social creed of True Womanhood (Welter), with white men’s social proscrip-
tions centered on manliness. This was especially so for Southern white men, 
who in addition to white women’s bodies, had sexual access to black women’s 
bodies due to slavery. However, with the erasure of the slave economy, white 
women were no longer limited in the expression of their sexual desire. The 
result was the thawing of sexual space that allowed white women to choose 
which body and thus what form of masculinity she desired. Therefore, with 
the visual calculus that Wells shaped for her “Northern” black middle-class 
woman audience to analyze during the experience seeing, she emptied the 
black male/white female dynamic of a pathos driven aesthetic for a logos cen-
tered ideology to emerge. In deflecting attention away from her audience’s 
pathos-infused visualizing, the true obscenity behind lynching—politics and 
economics—began to emerge. What also materializes is Wells’ ontological 
association of self-fashioning, agency, and power—all critical for her shaping 
presence at Lyric Hall. Wells’ ontology also produced a visual portal for her 
Lyric Hall audience’s experience of seeing to reinterpret and reconfigure mob 
lynching. 
The revolutionary effect of Wells’ Lyric Hall testimony is also profound 
because she was the first orator to publicly cross-examine white men’s man-
liness with a precise line of argument. Moreover, Wells gives “Southern” white 
men an invitation to redefine their position as the moral custodians of white 
womanhood, while challenging her “Northern” black middle-class woman au-
dience to transform their experience of seeing from a passive to an active visu-
alizing. However, it is important to examine implicitly and explicitly how Wells 
continues to give verbal and visual status to African American culture during 
her testimony at Lyric Hall. At the same time, it is valuable to illuminate why 
cultural signifiers are vital to subjugated groups when progressing beyond so-
cio-political restricted boundaries. 
Cultural Narrative as a Mechanism for Shaping 
Presence 
A shaping presence enables interdiscursivity between the orator’s representation of the 
experience and the audience’s cultural processing of the experience.
We tell our stories with the presence of others. Whether the subject in 
the narrative is dead, alive, or integrated or not in our lives—the subject is in-
timately involved with the structuring of our stories. Although all stories have 
material reality either by minutes, days, weeks, months, or years from when 
they are narratively represented; despite their material distance, some stories 
sit at the forefront of our consciousness and are easily retrievable for the nar-
rative. Other stories, however, when verbally articulated are brought into our 
consciousness unwillingly and we struggle to analyze and interpret their ethos 
from the narrative infrastructure.
Yet, despite the material isolation from the moment between when the 
event occurred and when it is situated in a coherent narrative, all agents and 
events are critical to the orator’s narrative judgment. Both subjects and events, 
then, regardless of their material location are not compositional barriers but 
rhetorical bridges to the “reading” of the narrative scene for the orator and 
her audience. However, this is a perplexing and ambiguous proposition since 
the relevance of the presence of others, and particularly the canvas of one’s 
culture, enables the shaping presence of the orator through narrative balance. 
To be sure, there is no silent construction during the building of a story. Both 
the orator and her culture are unconsciously colonizing each other’s narrative 
perspective—with both influencing the representation and performativity of 
the story. Cognitive psychologist, Jerome Bruner, for example, argues that “[t]
he story of one’s life is [. . .] a privileged but troubled narrative” (693) because 
he sees it as “reflexive” (693) given that the narrator is often a character in her 
own story. 
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Wells titles her second point heading as “The Black and White of It,” which 
aptly characterizes not only the racial split between blacks and whites, but also 
the socio-cultural divide between the two races. By tracing the contours of the 
“troubled narrative” between blacks and whites over the lynching issue, Wells 
continues to braid her testimony within legal discourse and with visual force. 
For example, Wells strategically returns to her “Preface” and pushes the white 
Delilah plot by recounting a story from the Memphis “Ledger” on “Lillie Bailey, 
a rather pretty white girl of seventeen years of age” (55) who gave birth to “a 
little coon” (55). Wells uses Lillie Bailey to demonstrate to her “elite” audience 
that “the “leading citizens” of Memphis were making a spectacle of themselves 
in defense of all [my emphasis] white women of every kind” (56) to include 
a poor “country girl” from “Mississippi” (56). The visual imagery of the white 
Delilah Wells painted earlier semantically shifts her black middle-class woman 
audience into her new framing of the lynching motive. Moreover, Wells boldly 
states again to Southern white men that the Northern public will not suspend 
doubt and judgment like “the South [. . .] shielding itself behind the [. . .] screen 
of defending the honor of its women” (61), especially white women like Lillie 
Bailey, who Wells suggests is sexually immoral and of a lower social status, like 
the biblical temptress Delilah. 
Wells uses Lillie Bailey’s lower class status as a visual signpost to remind 
her elite audience that like her middle-class friends McDowell, Stuart, and 
Moss, as African Americans, they cannot escape the indignities of Jim Crow 
even in New York. As evidence of this point, Wells clearly situates lynching as 
a genuine material threat to all African American regardless of their standing 
on the social ladder and argues persuasively that the judicial system is guilty 
in the legal tyranny of blacks. For example, Wells cites several cases of mid-
dle-class black men having sexual liaisons with willing lower-class white wom-
en and that “leading white men show that with them it is not the crime but the 
class [her emphasis]” (58). By utilizing the argumentative structure of a legal 
brief, Wells elaborates and extends her argument that lynching is powered by 
the economic climbing of blacks. Furthermore, by strategizing her testimony 
through a lawyer’s prose, Wells intersects race, culture, and the middle-class 
status of her audience to permit them to recognize the material reality of their 
situatedness. This tactic is not an empty rhetorical gesture since it will enable 
Wells to join her language marked by legal discourse to the discursive practice 
of visualizing.
Bruner theorizes, “language constructs what it narrates [. . .] semantical-
ly [. . .] pragmatically and stylistically” (696). I argue language visually guides 
as well and with considerable awareness by the rhetor to influence the audi-
ence’s framing of the narrative. If a life story is to be discursively meaningful, 
according to Bruner, it has to “mesh  [. . .] within a community of life stories” 
and he says, “tellers and listeners must share some ‘deep structure’” (699) to 
support the arrangement of the narrative. For example, by using the chosen 
people narrative as a refrain, Wells gives rhetorical, structural, thematic, and 
cultural unity to her life story. Wells also repeatedly calls the audience’s atten-
tion to her exile status as a member of the divinely appointed lost tribe4. In 
doing so, Wells not only collapses the boundaries between a religious and po-
litical division of lynching; her testimony takes a subtle “civic turn,” when later 
she places civic action demands on her audience. For Bruner, there has to be 
an ideological commitment or “tellers and listeners will [. . .] be alienated by a 
failure to grasp what the other is saying or what he thinks the other is hearing” 
(699). Indeed, with her purposive “life-story meshing” (700) Wells bridges the 
rhetorical distance between she and her audience with an ancient form of 
rhetorical practice.
Ekphrasis5 at the Scenes of the Struggle
A shaping presence is the rhetorical binding of the rhetor’s visual consciousness and 
verbal consciousness.
In her introduction to Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient 
Rhetorical Theory and Practice, Ruth Webb argues that ekphrasis is an an-
cient rhetorical skill that currently has “a very different definition” (1) because 
of “modern critical discourse” (1). Webb argues that ekphrasis’ threading to 
“the visual arts” (1) buries the “ancient sense” (1) of the term and wrongly im-
plies simply an aesthetic reflection of the world. Webb has shown, for exam-
ple, that the visual imagination can never exist apart from the verbal framing 
of the scene in the audience’s cognizance of the experience. Therefore, the 
verbal and the visual imagination are not neutral abstractions, but embod-
ied discourses to frame an understanding of the scene. For Webb, rhetorical 
ekphrasis in ancient settings was about “the use of language to try to make 
an audience imagine a scene” (3). She argues they “were alive with rich visual 
and emotional effects” (5). Ekphrasis, in this view, requires a cultivated ear and 
a cultivated eye, for they claim distinct aspects of the audience’s experienc-
es and perspectives to engage the orator’s discourse. As Webb further notes, 
ekphrasistic rhetoric was a way “to make the audience feel involved in the 
subject matter” (10). Moreover, like Bruner, Webb argues that culture plays an 
important ideological role because “the audience [will import] the details from 
their own imaginative resources and cultural knowledge” (153) as a means 
to participate in the rhetorical structuring of the rhetor’s discourse. Webb’s 
theories are important to consider when examining Wells’ Lyric Hall testimony 
since both listening and seeing within ekphrasistic rhetoric has broad ranging 
influence in the signifying effect of an orator’s structuring of the story. Wells 
notes in Crusade, “[a]s I described the cause of the trouble at home” [. . .] “my 
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mind went back to the scenes of the struggle” (79). For Wells, then, the “verbal-
izing” of the untold story was a rhetorical binding to the “visual” framing of the 
scene, which is why I argue that she applied the rich imagery of the Samson 
and Delilah biblical story in the “Preface” of her testimony. To reiterate Webb’s 
point, both modes (verbal and visual) discursively map a conceptual pathway 
for the audience’s and the rhetor’s experience of seeing to unify and grasp the 
rhetorical impact of the narrative.
By discursively interlocking the verbal to the visual, Wells is mapping for 
her audience a process for them to interpret how the visual and verbal are 
ideologically “acting on” each other. That is, for Wells, the verbal and visual 
are not insulated discursive practices but compounded representations that 
enable new systems of relations for critical analysis. Therefore, in Wells’ exph-
rasis testimony, which is how I will refer to her speech for the remainder of this 
article, she provides verbal and visual conceptual pathways to the experience 
of seeing the untold story for her elite audience.
“The New Cry,” is Wells’ third point heading in her fusion of legal brief 
discourse to her argument on the lawlessness of lynching. In Wells’ exphrasis 
testimony, she gives her elite audience no option but to consume lynching 
imagery since in many respects lynching carried greater force in their bour-
geois society than in lower-class African American culture. Therefore, Wells 
intensifies her deliberation that lynching is not separate from racial uplift ide-
ology, but is part of racial uplift ideology. With this thesis, Wells is strategically 
broadening her claim that McDowell, Stuart, and Moss were lynched for eco-
nomic reasons. This is important because Wells is demonstrating the effects of 
racial uplift, which was a social and increasingly political status she knew elite 
audience would not easily walk away from given the horrors of slavery, from 
which many of them were only one generation removed. Wells supports her 
argument, saying, “the whole matter is explained by the well-known opposi-
tion growing out of slavery to the progress of the race” (59-60). Wells continues 
to jolt her elite audience out of their middle-class comfort by reminding them 
they were still walled in and by their racial category into spaces that signify 
their difference and marginality. As an example, Wells cites the “separate car 
laws” (60) on trains where blacks “regardless of advancement” (60) had to sit in 
“filthy, stifling partitions” (60) although they were financially capable of paying 
for a better space on the train. By haunting her elite audience with imagery 
from the social indignities of their everyday lived experience, Wells is also sug-
gesting that they must rebel or the roots of their middle-class lifestyle.
Although Wells concedes, “the crime of rape is revolting” (61), she argues 
against the “better class of Afro-Americans [. . .] take[ing] the white man’s 
word” (61), without due process. For them to continue accepting the cultural 
construction of rape as she once did, Wells argues white society will continue, 
“to stamp us a race of rapists and desperadoes” (61) and bolster lynch mobs. 
Wells also appears to mock the naive idea of her elite audience that “general 
education and financial strength [of racial uplift ideology] would solve the diffi-
culty” (61) of lynching. Wells’ critique of her bourgeois audience may be viewed 
as harsh, but it also reveals Wells’ rhetorical skill, art, and craft with exphrasis. 
Moreover, the “The New Cry” of Wells’ third point heading makes the claim to 
her elite audience that their middle-class status was not protection against 
lynch mobs, but was in dialectical relation to lynching as was the middle-class 
status of McDowell, Stuart, and Moss. 
Wells’ use of ekphrasis then becomes fundamental to the construction of 
her testimonial at Lyric Hall given her visual packaging of the scene and her 
verbal account of lynching using public and legitimized documented sources 
from reputable newspapers. Nevertheless, how does the rhetor structure her 
narrative when the presence of accumulated cultural practices, codes, and 
knowledge loom, and often unrecognized, while shaping a presence for an au-
dience? For anthropologists, the process is embodied in the symbolic system 
of culture, which is always already active at the margins of the agent’s cultur-
al consciousness intervening during the portraiture formation. Further still, 
some of these cultural behaviors are called upon intentionally by the rhetor 
for affect.
Encountering Symbolic Traffic During Testimony
A shaping presence requires a method of reading, which is why the rhetor may use 
symbolic markers of culture, value-systems, and connection to a shared body of ideas 
for her audience to gain entrance into and engagement with the rhetor’s experience 
of seeing.
In Wells’ fourth point heading titled, “The Malicious and Untruthful White 
Press” she recounts in ekphrasistic detail the Lynching at the Curve. To be 
sure, at this stage in Wells’s testimony it was critical to insert the presence of 
McDowell, Stuart, and Moss to reiterate not only the racial ideology behind 
lynching, but also the black bourgeois style of life, which threatened and rivaled 
white Southern ideals of their social and economic station. However, it is im-
portant to note how Wells centers and harmonizes her criticism of the “White 
Press” and its rhetorical justification of lynching to African American social and 
economic mobility—hallmarks of white middle-class values, which McDowell, 
Stuart, and Moss were lynched for acquiring. By examining the intractability of 
lynching, Wells uses evidence printed in the Memphis “Daily Commercial” and 
the Memphis “Evening Scimitar” (62) to form her argument and to emphasize 
why newspapers were complicit in justifying lynch law. Wells writes, although 
“there had been no white woman in Memphis outraged by an Afro-American 
[. . .] the “Commercial” of May 17th,” published a story recounting “More Rapes, 
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More Lynchings” (62) that occurred in Alabama. In Wells’ interpretation, news-
papers like the Memphis Daily Commercial with their superficial “truth factor” 
wanted to incite lynch mob vigilantism and suppress the continuous economic 
ascent of middle-class blacks. 
It is valuable once again to stress the rhetorical and strategic brilliance of 
how Wells drew upon newspapers to shape her legal argument since many 
white journalists unintentionally reported the psychic impact of the sociopolit-
ical and cultural exclusion that African Americans experienced. It is equally va-
luble to stress that Wells was a highly competent and professional editor and 
journalist as co-owner of Free Speech. Therefore, we must not subsume Wells’ 
rhetorical and strategic crafting of Southern Horrors as discursive luck, but as 
a tactical epistemic and moral counterargument to lynching. For example, in 
the Memphis Evening Scimitar an unknown journalist writes, “Since the eman-
cipation came [. . .] the Negro has drifted away into a state which is neither 
freedom nor bondage” (62). This unknown journalist seems to grasp superfi-
cially the liminal state that African Americans were in as the progeny of slaves, 
and as free but disempowered people, without being able to comprehend 
intellectually the structural impediments they faced to assume sociopolitical 
and economic agency. Wells, however, clearly understood the restrictions, but 
also recognized the fundamental role the law would have to play in securing 
equal protection and due process against lynching. Equally fundamental to 
Wells were African American cultural anchors significant to the racial uplift 
campaign of her middle-class black woman audience, which is why the rhetor-
ical arc of her testimony is discursively visualized to the Lynching at the Curve.
Of McDowell, Stuart, and Moss, Wells writes, “[t]hey were peaceful, 
law-abiding citizens and energetic business men” (64). With this view of her 
friends, Wells is also making a similar character argument for her elite audi-
ence. Furthermore, she is also representing middle-class blacks as law-abiding 
citizens while at the same time denouncing the ethos of the white press, which 
racially depicts African Americans as “hopelessly [. . .] behind the other in ev-
erything that makes a great people” (64). The value in Wells’ character asser-
tion of McDowell, Stuart, and Moss and her elite audience is that it is contained 
within the black jeremiad’s visual imagery of the chosen people narrative.
By embedding the ethos of African Americans within the visual field of the 
“chosen people” narrative, Wells is also subverting the white press’s depiction 
of them. These visual divisions are important since they culturally constitute 
her elite audience within a higher visual realm of God’s faithful people suffer-
ing in bondage for eventual deliverance, rather than the white press’ imagery 
of a sexual and immoral race of people. Therefore, in organizing her elite au-
dience’s experience of seeing within culturally mediated imagery, Wells discur-
sively mutes the white press’ depiction of McDowell, Stuart, and Moss and all 
African Americans by visually trafficking them in familiar culturally significant 
symbols (Geertz 45). Drawing from cultural traffic to “impose meaning upon 
experience” (Geertz 45), Wells visually equips her elite audience with cultural 
imagery to synthesize their liminal space as middle-class African Americans 
after the “mockery of law and justice” (65) that failed to protect McDowell, 
Stuart, and Moss. Wells also articulates the legal deficiencies in middle-class 
black assimilation when Memphis blacks wanted to avenge the lynchings but 
were “counseled obedience to the law which did not protect them” (65). Wells 
illustrates the rhetor’s effectiveness of infusing symbolic markers of culture, 
value-systems, and connection to a shared body of ideas. By rhetorically har-
nessing her exphrasis testimony to the chosen people narrative, Wells visually 
drives her elite audience’s experience of seeing to the Mosaic people’s exodus 
from Egypt, who like her fellow Memphis blacks, “left the city in great num-
bers” (65) mindful of the coming liberation.
During the experience of seeing, the agent’s culture places individual and 
collective demands on her that are rooted in symbolic traffic. Indeed, culture 
simply inspires the meaning-making process, serving only as an index for the 
agent to discover and reveal the difficulties through which she views, con-
structs, and interacts within her world. With this understanding, culture is a po-
litical instrument where power and agency are mobilized against oppression.
Shaping Presence Within Civic Discourse     
A shaping presence is a public portraiture rather than the private identity of the rhetor.
In this section, I analyze Wells’ fifth point heading, “The South’s Position” 
and Wells’ sixth and final point heading “Self Help,” to demonstrate her inter-
twining of cultural identity to political activism. Staying true to the framework 
of the legal brief, Wells continues to present evidence from reputable newspa-
pers as a statement of facts, offers her argument, and provides a conclusion 
to make her case on the lawlessness of lynching. Wells presents the every-
day lived experiences of blacks, and particularly middle-class blacks, in a legal 
discursive frame to criticize the absence of protecting blacks from lynching, 
but also as legal leverage to use for changing lynch law. For Wells, linkages 
between the two are undeniably related to agency for middle-class blacks and 
the entire race. A greater relationship Wells seems to suggest to her elite audi-
ence is the public role they must play in transforming the legal system despite 
claims from respected journalists. For example, Wells cites distinguished jour-
nalist Henry W. Grady to amplify the white press’ central argument that blacks 
were “incapable of self-government” (66). As a counterargument, Wells em-
phasizes the extreme exclusion of blacks from the “ballot [. . .] civil rights [and] 
civil courts” (66) to challenge the false claim that blacks were incompetent to 
govern themselves. This was a meaningful and significant point for Wells to 
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mention to her elite audience since earlier in her testimony she rooted lynch-
ing in a racial and cultural context that had economic overtones. Although 
Wells maps lynching to the growing economic strength of middle-class blacks, 
she suggests at its core, lynching is a genocidal assault on the black race and 
culture. This again is an echo back to the prophetic tone of the chosen people 
narrative from the “murdering, burning and lynching” (66) that black people 
must endure as a precondition of liberation. With this point of view, cultur-
al stories are not benign and trivial narratives but a “bridging device” (Burke 
224) with both verbally and visually expressive rhetorical tools for racial unity 
and collective sociopolitical agency. By optimizing the cultural awareness of 
the chosen people narrative in her exphrasis testimony, Wells is also priming 
her elite audience for active civic engagement to influence political opinion on 
lynch law.
Wells notes to her elite audience the growing divisions within the press 
over the continued “lawlessness and lynching” (67) by the South, which was 
the moral gateway for many “dailies and weeklies” (67) to say publicly “lynch 
law must go” (67). Building on the “healthy public sentiment” (68) forged by 
some members of the white press, Wells accuses their morally silent audi-
ence of being “equally guilty” (68) with the vigilantism of the lynch mobs. To 
be sure, for white anti-lynching sympathizers, this visual imagery of being 
ideologically in alliance with lynch mobs was perhaps morally and religiously 
offensive to their belief system. Consequently, Wells demanded the institu-
tionalized discourse of the law and the legal system “to be employed against 
them [lynch mobs]” (68), which was beneficial to the nation as a whole. 
 It is important to note, however, that out of the six point headings, 
Wells’ fifth point heading, “The South’s Position,” is the briefest section of her 
statement of facts. In it, Wells reiterates her main arguments: the intersubjec-
tive relation between the white press, lynching, law, black economic progress, 
and black people as a race. That these are impediments to black exclusion in 
the larger sociopolitical and economic spheres was not surprising; that the 
mechanisms are discursively related to the transformation of lynch law, in-
dividual and collective African American liberty, was a new point of entry to 
situate the all-encompassing force of lynching. Wells’ rhetorical appropriation 
of the discourse and structure of a legal brief enabled the storytelling meth-
od of “testifyin” (Smitherman) to expose the obstacles of the legal system to 
lynch law. As noted above, Wells did provide examples of slow moral change 
by a handful of the white press. Although this was an important shift in the 
public rebuttal of lynching, Wells argues for a sustained legal and critical re-
action against lynching (Horrors 68) to awaken the frustration and impatience 
that African Americans were experiencing as targets for lynching violence. For 
Wells, then, there was only one group with the moral backing to present an 
unremitting legal, moral, and critical attack on the sociopolitical transforma-
tion of lynch law—her middle-class black woman audience at Lyric Hall. 
Jones Royster encourages modern scholars of feminist rhetoric to keep 
a penetrating vigilant eye on history lest we miss the varied character(s) and 
characterization(s) of the past that shape our presence. In her article, “In 
Search of Ways In,” Royster writes that “We need to keep prying the inquiry 
open, to keep extending the conversation, casting and recasting, to find other 
‘ways in’ to a territory that is so richly endowed with a multiplicity of experi-
ences and so deeply deserving of attention, thought, and more thought” (390). 
Who sees, as Royster suggests, influences the representation of history, since 
the past is never transparent but only transferred through a constructed con-
sciousness, and often one of privilege freed of marginal and subjugated sta-
tus. Wells’ 1892 Lyric Hall exphrasis testimony is an explicit oratorical example 
of a black woman in Royster’s words of “prying the inquiry open,” into the 
myth, manners, and false morality that substantiated the lynching of African 
Americans in the nineteenth-century. 
Like Royster, Wells stirs a related rhetorical appeal in her sixth and final 
point heading titled “Self-Help,” to embolden her elite audience into civic ac-
tion. It is worth noting that Wells is once again suggesting—although in her 
title—that culture is not separate from politics but intertwined with it. Wells 
also takes aim at black reliance on a broken legal and political system to act 
on their behalf. Moreover, she argues that “black” governability is critical to 
“black” sociopolitical agency. “[The] Afro-American can do for himself what no 
one else can do for him” (68), she asserts as she reached the climax of her 
exphrasis testimony. 
Wells alters her middle-class black woman audience’s presence from their 
private Victorian complacency to a public portraiture with civic action as an 
essential feature. With the convergence of the two, Wells argues that blacks 
can no longer remain subordinate and powerless to a law and legal system 
with its token representation of them. For Wells, freedom did not mean blind 
obedience to a corrupt standard of law that defined blacks as inferior human 
beings. To continue to give allegiance to a judicial system that did not ensure 
“equal protection of the laws” not only guaranteed more lynchings; to Wells 
it also violated human dignity and moral self-worth. “Nothing, absolutely 
nothing,” she expresses with a new revolutionary politic, “is to be gained by 
a further sacrifice of manhood and self-respect” (69). With this radical call for 
insurgent activism, Wells marks the turning point in her exphrasis testimony 
because she is consciously integrating and applying race to politics and law. 
Thus, Wells shifted the political and legal onus of sociopolitical empowerment 
from the law to blacks arguing, “the Afro-American can demand and secure 
his rights, the punishment of lynchers, and a fair trial for accused rapists” (70). 
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This weakening of the law’s ethos as the singular legal and moral protector 
of blacks is a valuable prerequisite for Wells’ elite audience in the final state-
ments of her exphrasis testimony because it strengthened African American’s 
claim to political, legal, and moral autonomy.
As a concluding point in her exphrasis testimony, Wells returns to her first 
statement of fact which indicts the veracity of the white press because they 
print “unreliable and doctored reports of lynchings” (70). For Wells, one could 
not divorce insufficient facts and information from constituent elements of 
a society who would benefit from the creation of false documentation. This 
was apparent in the Lynching at the Curve of her friends McDowell, Stuart, 
and Moss whose Peoples grocery store rivaled in both customers and profit 
a grocery store owned by a white male. As Wells argued, there was not only 
an economic reason created to repress, subjugate, and lynch blacks who 
were economically successful, but also to forestall the economic rise of future 
black entrepreneurs. Wells’ view not only provides a cogent interpretation of 
the lynching issue, it also brought out the possibility that unless blacks took 
substantial civic action on their behalf, blacks cannot presume that the white 
press would report the truth behind many of the false claims of rape that pre-
cipitated lynchings. “The Afro-American papers,” (70) in contrast to the white 
press, Wells argues, “are the only ones which will print the truth” (70). Wells’ 
emphasis on the collective ethos of blacks stemmed from the traditions, prac-
tices, and stories of African American culture that revealed their power and 
significance when bound to civic action. Shirley Wilson Logan gives a rhetori-
cally systematic study of the the black press in Liberating Language and argues 
that it was more than just a passive communication medium to disseminate 
facts. For Logan, the black press “functioned as a site of rhetorical education” 
(97) to intervene and counter the marketing of racial stereotypes of African 
Americans within the white press. For Wells, shattering this dehumanized view 
of African Americans perpetrated by the white press in favor of an image that 
endowed black humanity with moral autonomy was critical.
In her final comments, Wells elevates the theme and tone of her last point 
heading, “Self-Help,” to drive home the view that lynch law demanded extraor-
dinary and immediate civic action from African Americans. If blacks were to 
achieve a new and revolutionary political presence in the United States, she ar-
gues, “[we] must act” (72). To be sure, Wells’ statement is consciously charged 
with kairos to stress the urgency of reforming lynch law since all blacks shared 
the risk of being lynched. Wells’ promotion of civic action also necessitated a 
public portraiture of her elite audience rather than a veiled one if they were 
to reform the “last relic of barbarism and slavery” (72). By ascribing a public 
visual presence—rather than a private one—as central to civic action, Wells is 
asserting the visual ethos of black humanity while invading and demolishing 
the degenerate visualization of blacks created with picturesque language by 
the white press. Visual rupture, then, promotes a vision of resistance and ref-
ormation which “is central to disrupting fixed notions of identity embodied 
in the act of visualizing” (August 255). In both cases, the experience of seeing 
is enmeshed within the visual constituting of black humanity. With this view, 
blacks become the emissaries of their own racial and cultural self-fashioning 
rather than the vision constructed by the visual coding in the discursive prac-
tices of the white press.
Wells reiterates the chosen people narrative to conclude her exphrasis 
testimony because of the rhetorical weight of its messianic mission in African 
American culture. The story’s central concept is that God has given a liberat-
ed race of people a profound task to set an example of human dignity and 
moral righteousness for their nation to follow. In giving lived reality to the 
flowering of the divine call, Wells lifts the story from its ancient biblical domain 
and locates it within the legal discourse over lynch law. Wells ends with the 
statement, “The gods help those who help themselves” (72). With these last 
words to her middle-class black woman audience, Wells calls on them as the 
“chosen people” to come from the periphery so the prophecy can materialize. 
Her words are explicit, tactical, and politicized because they shift the burden of 
black liberation from God to African Americans. Wells is suggesting that legal 
and civic inaction is no longer an option since they are rhetorically interdepen-
dent and one cannot obscure the discourse of the other. This is also an argu-
ment that agency and power is best represented as a collective instrument for 
communal social change, rather than an individual interest to secure personal 
entitlements. For Wells, then, the public reformation of lynch law was a risk, 
but it was a risk that collectively African Americans needed; communal soli-
darity would restructure the law for protection from the vigilantism of lynch 
mobs. By fastening a God-given right to social, political, and legal justice in 
her exphrasis testimony, Wells is enriching both the verbal and visual ethos of 
the black jeremiad. Furthermore, she is also arguing that the exigence for the 
“chosen people” to wage war against their enemy has arrived.   
Conclusion
The key idea in this interdisciplinary analysis of Ida B. Wells’ 1892 Lyric Hall 
exphrasis testimony is that a shaping presence is a deliberate summoning of 
the rhetor’s understanding and representation of a discursive practice bound 
up in hegemonic ideologies. For example, the economic status of middle-class 
blacks was not just a masking force behind lynch law; rather, it played an active 
role in lynching practices to confine all African Americans into an unprotected 
legal state, which would allow the lawlessness of lynching to continue without 
due process. By providing a richer framing of lynch law; specifically within legal 
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discourse and the black jeremiad, Wells pointed out to her middle-class black 
woman audience the necessity of collective civic action to reform and redress 
lynch law. Furthermore, Wells stressed the importance of a visual presence 
during civic action since “everything signifies ceaselessly and several times” 
(Barthes 12). Perhaps, then, the most significant effect of Wells’ exphrasis tes-
timony was, in her words, “the real beginning of the club movement6 among 
the colored women” (Crusade 81), which advocated their participation in the 
political culture as African Americans and as civic-minded women. 
Notes
1  The lynching was named thus because it took place where “They 
[McDowell, Stuart, and Moss] had located their grocery in the district known 
as the “Curve” because the streetcar line curved sharply at that point” (Crusade 
48).
2  The story of Samson and Delilah is a biblical narrative of power, lust, 
and seduction in Judges 16. Samson, a Nazirite and favored by God as judge 
to deliver Israel from their oppressor was known for his inhuman strength, 
which was a secret. Delilah, a temptress, was paid by the Philistines to sexually 
seduce Samson into revealing his war strength (his hair). When Samson falls 
asleep, Delilah invites someone in his tent to shave his hair, which makes him 
vulnerable to the Philistines who eventually blind him in order to neutralize his 
God-given strength and power.
3 Sacvan Bercovitch refers to the jeremiad as a “state-of-the-covenant 
address” (4) used in seventeenth-century New England Puritan pulpits as a po-
litical sermon delivered “at every public occasion [. . .] and most elaborately at 
election day gatherings” (4) to reinforce Christian morals and instill fidelity to 
a particular political perspective. However, by the time of the Civil War, African 
Americans took ownership of the term and discursively inscribed “jeremiad” 
with their cultural, political, and rhetorical situatedness in America. Thus, the 
“black” jeremiad.
4 The biblical description of the “lost tribe” refers primarily to the twelve 
tribes of Israel who were conquered and enslaved by the Assyrian Empire. 
However, in African American religious lore, the lost tribe is a vision of tran-
scendence for a diasporic people chosen and favored by God to preach and 
exemplify an ethical and resilient conception of faith to a corrupt system of 
justice. 
5 Enargeia (rather than energeia) is often cited to demonstrate the viv-
idness of imagery during the visualizing process. While it is an enriching term 
to depict the subject’s encounter with imagery, I prefer Webb’s weightier defi-
nition of ekphrasis, which focuses the subject’s attention on the cognitive pro-
cessing of imagery rather than the aesthetic awareness. Although the words 
enargeia and exphrasis are used interchangeably, Webb clearly distinguishes 
the two with ekphrasis providing the audience a more directed visual of the 
experience of seeing to include cultural content. 
6 For more information on the emergence of Black Women’s Clubs, see 
Paula J. Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on 
Race and Sex in America.  New York: William Morrow, 1984. 
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